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ABSTRACT 
 
A great deal of work has been published over the past 
decade on the application of neural networks to 
stockmarket trading.  Individual researchers have 
developed their own techniques for designing and testing 
these neural networks, and this presents a difficulty 
when trying to learn lessons and compare results.  This 
paper aims to present a methodology for designing 
robust mechanical trading systems using soft computing 
technologies, such as artificial neural networks. This 
methodology describes the key steps involved in creating 
a neural network for use in stockmarket trading, and 
places particular emphasis on designing these steps to 
suit the real-world constraints the neural network will 
eventually operate in. Such a common methodology 
brings with it a transparency and clarity that should 
ensure that previously published results are both reliable 
and reusable.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) have earned 
themselves an excellent reputation as non-linear 
approximators.  According to Tan [1], of all the AI 
techniques available, ANNs are the technique which 
deals best with uncertainty.  Like other forms of soft-
computing, ANNs exhibit a high tolerance to 
imprecision and perform well in noisy data 
environments. 
These characteristics of ANNs make them particularly 
suited to financial problem domains, particularly the 
arena of financial trading.  The stockmarket represents a 
datasource with an abundance of uncertainty and noise.  
Indeed, it is these characteristics which make financial 
trading both particularly challenging and particularly 
rewarding. 
There have been repeated attempts by a number of 
researchers to apply ANNs to the problem of developing 
mechanical trading systems.  In this context, a 
mechanical trading system is one which operates 
according to a fixed set of rules, and contains no 
discretionary components.  Unfortunately, there are a 
number of concerns with the manner in which this field 
appears to have progressed.   
Principal amongst these concerns is a lack of a formal 
methodology describing the procedure to follow to 
create mechanical trading systems using soft computing, 
indeed, a lack of a formal methodology describing how 
to create any mechanical trading systems.  The reasons 
for this are crystal clear.  Successful systems traders 
jealously guard their intellectual capital regarding their 
development methodologies.  This inhibits many 
researchers from developing systems which would 
actually work when real-world constraints were applied. 
Apart from the lack of understanding of the methods of 
creating such trading systems, there is a further lack of 
understanding about the correct way to benchmark and 
test such systems.  Again, this is understandable.  
Unfortunately, this appears to have led to a situation 
where published results may be the end combination of a 
vast number of prior experiments, leading to poorly 
developed systems.  In practice, such systems usually 
fail rapidly. 
Further complications in the development process come 
from a lack of understanding of the constraints of real-
world trading, such as accounting for transaction costs, 
and the implementation of money management 
algorithms.   
Developing economically feasible trading systems using 
ANNs is possible, although it is clearly a complex task. 
In many ways, ANNs themselves compound the 
difficulty. As noted by White [2], neural methods of 
back-propogation are designed to reduce network 
training error. Perhaps a better objective would be to 
optimize profit subject to risk, an opportunity not 
directly afforded by using neural networks. 
 The objective in using ANNs to design trading systems 
is to attempt to resolve the mismatch between traders’ 
behavioural expectations, and ANN training methods, 
through careful selection of the ANNs inputs and 
outputs. 
Conducting the development process within a well 
defined methodology, subject to real-world trading 
constraints and effective benchmarking is the key to 
designing successful mechanical trading systems. 
This paper will aim to lay down a methodology for 
developing a mechanical trading system using ANNs.  
From an ANN viewpoint, it will cover the selection of 
inputs, the ANN architecture, and the ANN outputs.  
From a trading system viewpoint, it will focus on real-
world constraints, and the technique of benchmarking. 
The starting point for the creation of a trading ANN is 
the selection of variables likely to influence the desired 
outcome. There are a number of methods used by 
practitioners to find such variables, and they broadly fall 
within the remit of either Fundamental Analysis, or 
Technical Analysis.  It is essential to have an 
understanding of these two complementary forms of 
analysis, so that an intelligent choice of inputs can be 
made, and these can be matched to likely outputs in 
terms of their possible effect and duration. 
This paper will review research in the areas of 
fundamental and technical analysis, to arm the reader 
with the required knowledge to confidently select neural 
inputs and likely outputs. The mechanics of trading 
system structure and design are also reviewed. The paper 
will then continue with a study of ANNs themselves, 
paying particular regard to architecture.  At that point, 
the paper will progress to a study of real-world trading 
constraints, such as slippage, accounting for costs, and 
money management.  Finally, the paper will describe 
appropriate techniques to benchmark a mechanical 
stockmarket trading system. 
The methodology presented here is distilled from a 
combination of trading systems research and experience. 
This paper does not attempt to claim that following this 
methodology will lead to guaranteed success, nor that 
there is no other way to develop a successful ANN 
trading system.  
It simply attempts to add an element of process to a 
research area whose results are often as chaotic as the 
underlying processes studied.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Both the fields of Fundamental Analysis and Technical 
Analysis have long histories of using their variables as 
predictors of future returns.  This Literature Review 
highlights some of the key papers which support this 
approach, and, in the case of Technical Analysis, 
addresses some concerns of academic credibility.   
When searching the domain of possible fundamental or 
technical variables to include in an ANN, it is generally 
advised that all variables selected be supported by 
published research. 
2.1. FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS 
There is a long established tradition of attempting to use 
the financial ratios produced from fundamental analysis 
as predictors of a company’s future share price (or 
return, or price direction).   
The process of using fundamental variables to make 
stock trading decisions begins with Benjamin Graham, 
as early as 1928.  Publication of Grahams work dates 
back to his first book, Security Analysis, in 1934.  This 
book is still in print and is now in its 5th edition.   
Graham produced a number of books distilling 
investment wisdom, including the Intelligent Investor, 
initially published in 1949.  This book, last published in 
1973, made detailed comments on the building of 
portfolios and selecting stocks.  Graham urged investors 
to pay attention to three fundamental variables, namely 
size of firm, capitalization, and price-earnings ratio.  The 
book provided detailed information of how to select 
companies using these variables.  Research by 
Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum [3], tested Grahams 
approach to determine its effectiveness.  They extracted 
the rules provided to investors in each of the four 
editions of The Intelligent Investor, and using publically 
available information, found that positive risk-adjusted 
rates of return were delivered to investors that followed 
the approach between 1956 and 1975.  Rates of return 
were 3% to 3.5% higher than a naïve buy-and-hold 
stategy (in a frictionless market).  When the various 
market frictions (costs) were taken into account, rates of 
return were 2% to 2.5% higher than the buy-and-hold 
strategy.  Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum state that ‘…it 
is reasonable to conclude that our evidence contradicts 
the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis’. 
According to Lowe [4], Graham also published a list of 
ten attributes of an undervalued stock, which could be 
used by investors seeking excess return.  These ten 
attributes were: 
• Earnings-to-price yield >= double the AAA bond 
yield, 
• P/E <= four-tenths highest average P/E in most recent 
5 years 
• Dividend yield >= two-thirds the AAA bond yield, 
• Price <= two-thirds tangible book value per share 
• Price <= two thirds net current asset value 
• Total debt less than tangible book value 
• Current ratio >= 2 
• Total debt <= net quick liquidation value 
• Earnings doubled in most recent 10 years, and 
• No more than two declines in earnings of 5 percent or 
more in the past 10 years 
 
It was noted that few companies could meet all 10 
criteria. 
Grahams work inspired a number of researchers to focus 
on detecting security price return anomalies that could 
be ascribed to fundamental variables.   
Graham’s value investment philosophy is well 
entrenched, in part due to the success of Warren Buffett, 
who is widely recognized as the world’s greatest 20th 
century investor.  Buffett credits his success to Graham, 
however, according to Bierig [5], rather than just seeing 
a balance sheet as a frozen snapshot of a company, 
Buffett broadens his definition of value, and investigates 
the dynamics of the company. In this sense, Buffet has 
become subjective rather than objective. 
Basu [6] investigated whether stocks with low P/E ratios 
earned excess returns when compared to stocks with 
high P/E ratios.  It was found that during the study 
period (April 1957 – March 1971), portfolios built from 
low P/E stocks earned higher returns than those 
portfolios built from higher P/E stocks, even after 
adjusting returns for risk.  The study concluded that 
there is an information content present in publicly 
available P/E ratios, which could offer opportunities for 
investors, and that this was inconsistent with the semi-
strong form of the EMH.  There are some clear parallels 
with the first two guidelines of Graham’s 10-point list 
here.  The first guideline suggested earnings-to-price 
yield be double the AAA bond yield.  The earnings-to-
price yield is the inverse of the P/E ratio, and ensuring it 
is greater than the AAA bond yield effectively capped 
the P/E ratio.  In this manner, it steered investors away 
from high P/E stocks.  The second guideline required 
P/E be four-tenths highest average P/E in most recent 5 
years, again, effectively steering the investor away from 
high P/E stocks. 
Banz [7] focused on the ‘size effect’.  Essentially, the 
size effect concerns the relationship between the market 
capitalization of a firm, and its return.  Banz reports that 
during the study period (1936 – 1975), common stock of 
small firms had higher returns than the common stock of 
large firms, even after adjusting for risk.  Banz also 
raises the issue that the size effect may just be a proxy 
for one or more other factors, which are correlated with 
size, an interpretation he also applies to Basu’s findings 
concerning the P/E effect. 
Also in 1981, Reinganum [8] described a 
misspecification of the simple one-period CAPM model, 
namely, that data on firm size can be used to create 
portfolios that earn abnormal returns.  From studying 
small firms listed on the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges, during the period from 1963 to 1977, 
Reinganum discovered average rates of return for small 
firms to be nearly 20% per year greater than those of 
large firms. 
Rosenberg et al. [9] presented two strategies aimed at 
exploiting fundamental information to increase returns. 
The first, the “book/price” strategy buys stocks with a 
high ratio of book value to market price, and sells stocks 
with the reverse.  The second strategy, “specific return 
reversal” computes specific returns per stock, and relies 
on the observation that specific returns tend to reverse in 
the subsequent month.  Thus, this strategy buys stocks 
with negative specific returns in the preceding month, 
exploiting this reversal.    The study sourced data from 
Compustat, on 1400 of the largest companies, from 1980 
to 1984, and stocks were priced mainly from the NYSE.  
The study demonstrated statistically significant results of 
abnormal performance for both strategies, and suggests 
that prices on the NYSE are inefficient.  Here, the first 
strategy provides support for Graham’s fourth guideline, 
namely that price be two-thirds tangible book value per 
share, effectively steering the investor toward stocks 
with a higher book value than price. 
DeBondt and Thayler [10] present evidence that 
investors tend to overreact when considering recent data.  
This overreaction led to a reversal effect, with stocks 
that had been prior ‘losers’ likely to become future 
‘winners’.  The researchers also investigate seasonality 
patterns in returns data.  They demonstrate that the 
winner-loser effect is not primarily a size effect, and the 
earnings of ‘winner’ firms and ‘loser’ firms show 
reversal patterns consistent with overreaction.  In terms 
of seasonal influence, DeBondt and Thayler report that 
excess returns for ‘losers’ are negatively related to both 
long-term and short-term formation performance, 
particularly in January.  For ‘winners’, they find that 
January excess returns are negatively related to the 
excess returns for the prior December. 
Detailed research from Fama and French [11] surveys 
the above style of anomaly detection, and conclude that 
if asset-pricing is rational, then size and the ratio of book 
value of a stock to its market value must be proxies for 
risk, as opposed to reflecting market inefficiency.   
Lakonishok et al [12] find that a wide range of value 
strategies (based on sales growth, Book-to-market, Cash 
flow, earnings, etc) have produced higher returns, and 
refute Fama and French’s claims that these value 
strategies are fundamentally riskier.  Using data from 
end-April 1963 to end-April 1990, for the NYSE and 
AMEX, Lakonishok et al find evidence that the market 
appears to have consistently overestimated future growth 
rates for glamour stocks relative to value stocks, and that 
the reward for fundamental risk does not explain the 
10% - 11% higher average returns on value stocks.  This 
study lends further support to the fourth guideline, again 
effectively steering the investor toward stocks with a 
higher book value than price. 
Fama and French [13] respond to Lakonishok et al by 
focusing on size and book-to-value, and form portfolios 
of stocks partitioned by these variables from the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ, from 1963 to 1992.  Their results 
demonstrate that both size and BE/ME (book-to-market 
equity) are related to profitability, but find no evidence 
that returns respond to the book-to-market factor in 
earnings.  They conclude that size and BE/ME are 
proxies for sensitivity to risk factors in returns.  Their 
results also suggest that there is a size factor in 
fundamentals that might lead to a size-related factor in 
returns. 
Later, Fama and French [14] study returns on market, 
value and growth portfolios for the US and twelve major 
EAFE countries (Europe, Australia, and the Far East).  
They recognize that value stocks tend to have higher 
returns than growth stocks, finding a difference between 
low B/M (Book-to-market) stocks and high B/M stocks 
of 7.68% per year on average.  They find similar value 
premiums when investigating earnings/price, cash 
flow/price and dividend/price.  They find that value 
stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen 
major markets during 1975 – 1995.  They also find a 
value premium in emerging markets.  Fama and French 
conclude that these results are explained by a one-state-
variable ICAPM (or a two-factor APT) that explains 
returns with the global market return and a risk factor for 
relative distress. 
Frankel and Lee [15] estimate firms fundamental values 
(V) using I/B/E/S concensus forecasts and a residual 
income model.  They find that V is highly correlated 
with stock price, and that the V/P ratio is a good 
predictor of long-term returns.  They state that this effect 
is not explained by a firm’s market beta, B/P ratio, or 
total market capitalization (size).  They also find 
evidence that errors in consensus analysts forecasts are 
predictable, and these prediction errors can be exploited 
by incorporating the error with V/P.  They conclude that 
the evidence suggests that firm’s value estimates may 
well provide a better forecast ability than simply using 
ratios, and that prices converge to value estimates 
gradually over greater than 12 month horizons.  They 
also state that the predictability of long-term forecast 
errors in consensus forecasts is consistent with a long-
term mispricing hypothesis.  Finally, the authors also 
acknowledge that the results may demonstrate yet 
another proxy for cross-sectional risk differences, but 
state that this is an unlikely conclusion. 
Piotroski [16] investigates whether fundamental analysis 
can be used to provide abnormal returns, and right shift 
the returns spectrum earned by a value investor.  In 
anomaly terms, Piotroski focused on high book-to-
market securities, and shows that the mean return earned 
by a high book-to-market investor can be shifted to the 
right by at least 7.5% annually, and a simple investment 
strategy based on high book-to-market securities 
generates a 23% annual return between 1976 and 1996.  
The research is stimulated by the observation that 
portfolios of high book-to-market firms normally contain 
several strong performing firms (achieving strong 
returns), and many deteriorating ones (achieving poor 
returns). Piotroski defines three different classes of 
financial performance signals, namely: 
• Profitability, 
• Leverage, Liquidity and source of funds, and, 
• Operating Efficiency.   
 
From these three classes of signals, nine simple signals 
are defined, and an aggregate score of the nine signals is 
used to rank the constituents.  The nine signals involve 
seven fundamental variables, namely: 
• net income before extraordinary items,  
• cash flow from operations, (both scaled by the 
beginning of year total assets), 
• leverage,  
• liquidity,  
• whether external financing has been raised recently,  
• current gross margin scaled by total sales, and  
• current year asset turnover ratio.  
 
Within the portfolios constructed from the higher 
aggregates, Piotroski notes that the returns are 
concentrated in small and medium sized companies, 
companies with low share turnover, and firms with low 
analyst following.  It is also noted that superior 
performance is not dependant on initial low share prices. 
Again, support is found for Graham’s fourth guideline in 
this study. Of further interest is the determination that 
one-sixth of the annual return difference between the ex-
ante strong and weak firms is earned over the four three-
day periods surrounding earning announcements.  This 
information is of obvious interest to those advocating 
market timing approaches. 
Kanas [17] finds a non-linear relation between stock 
returns and the fundamental variables of dividends and 
trading volume. 
Aby et al. [18] focus on combining fundamental 
variables to screen stocks for value.  This is a reasonably 
common approach, with some authors reporting 
outstanding results.  Aby et al. developed portfolios 
based on four fundamental conditions, namely: Single 
Valued P/E (P/E<10), Market Price < Book Value, 
established track record of return on Shareholder Equity 
(ROE > 12%), and dividends paid out less than 25% of 
earnings.  They conclude that when the four criteria are 
used to screen stocks, quality investments seem to result, 
again providing support for Graham’s fourth guideline.  
The authors state that higher yields do not seem to 
provide good long term returns, possibly due to the use 
of retained earnings to enhance equity per share.  
Overall, the main contribution of their work is to 
establish a relationship between ROE (> 12), and share 
price performance.  The research alludes to the fact that 
Buffett believes 12 is an appropriate value for ROE in 
domestic (US) markets. The authors find that the value 
of 12 for ROE provides a clear line of demarcation 
between performance and non-performance is share 
price terms.  The authors tested the filter criteria against 
the Value Line database between August 31, 1989 to 
August 31, 1999.  The filter conditions described cut the 
database down from 6000 possible stocks to just 14.  
These 14 yielded an average return of 30.55% per year 
for the ten years. It is interesting to note that in earlier 
work Aby et al. [19], the same authors had focused on 
shares with simply a low P/E and a market price below 
book value, and had concluded that this filter method did 
not produce satisfactory returns. 
2.2. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
Modern Technical Analysis dates from the work of 
Charles Dow, who in 1884 drew up an average of the 
daily closing prices of 11 important stocks.  Between 
1900 and 1902, Dow wrote a series of articles in the 
Wall Street Journal documenting stock price patterns and 
movements he observed in the average.  These articles 
were the first to describe systematic phenomena in the 
stock markets. 
Although Dow’s work represents the beginning of 
modern technical analysis, it is worthy of note that 
markets and analysis techniques existed centuries before 
this, notably in Japan since 1730, where the first futures 
contracts (in rice) were traded. For a fascinating 
description of the operation of these markets, refer to 
Nison [20]. Tvede [21] reports that interest in the future 
prices of these rice ‘futures’ ran high, with the Japanese 
government suspending the forward market in 1869 due 
to excessive volatility. 
Today, a manual of technical analysis is likely to be 
composed of techniques which fall into one of three 
primary classifications, namely: 
• Charting (typically pattern matching), 
• Indicators (and oscillators), 
• Esoteric approaches 
 
This paper will focus on the technical indicators and 
oscillators, as these are easily reproduced according to 
their mathematical definitions.  In contrast, Charting and 
pattern matching is usually highly subjective and without 
rigorous mathematical definition.  Esoteric approaches 
are excluded from this study, as they have no scientific 
justification.  Warnecke [22] provides examples of the 
criticisms often leveled at these techniques. 
Technical Analysis is enjoying a recent resurgence in 
academia after having been out of favour for several 
decades.  The main reason for this lack of favour 
concerns the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which 
supports the random-walk theory.  In essence, since the 
early work of Fama [23], the random-walk theory has 
held sway.  This theory states that successive price 
changes in stock prices are independent, identically 
distributed random variables.  The important implication 
of this hypothesis is that it implies that a series of price 
changes has no memory, which further implies that the 
study of past prices cannot provide a useful contribution 
to predicting future prices.  As the majority of technical 
analysis techniques focus on probability based on past 
price behavior, the natural conclusion is that Technical 
Analysis cannot work. 
Regardless of the random walk theory, a large number of 
market participants use technical analysis as their main 
method of stock selection.  Indeed, Taylor and Allen 
[24] conducted a UK survey of forex dealers on behalf 
of the Bank of England, and found that at least 90% of 
the respondents placed some weight on Technical 
Analysis for decision making. It has been suggested that 
due to its high usage, technical analysis may, in fact, be 
becoming a self-fulfilling methodology.  In other words, 
if enough people follow the principles, then those 
principles can be expected to become manifest in the 
character of price time series. 
To complete the discussion regarding technical analysis, 
it is occasionally stated that as technical rules become 
more widely known, the abnormal returns they attempt 
to identify will be reduced, and the usefulness of the 
technical rules themselves will be destroyed.  Silber [25] 
finds against this conclusion, instead concluding that 
‘the continued success of simple technical trading rules 
is possible as long as there are price smoothing 
participants in the market’.  In this context, Silber’s 
example of price smoothing participants refers to the 
central banks. 
Rather than focus on Technical Analysis as a discipline, 
the remainder of this literature review will focus on the 
research support for the use of Technical Analysis 
variables, such as Moving Averages, Indicators and 
Oscillators. 
The majority of the academic literature concerning 
technical analysis concerns the testing of simple 
technical rules, such as moving averages.  Truly 
effective technical rules are not published in academic 
journals, and are usually kept secret.  
According to Pring [26], there are three basic principles 
of Technical Analysis, namely: 
• Prices move in trends, 
• Volume goes with the trend, 
• A trend, once established tends to persist 
 
The moving average and its derivatives are designed to 
expose when a security has begun trending, and as such, 
deal with the first and third principles listed above.  The 
idea of observing (and profiting from) trends has a long 
history, and is one of the early systematic phenomena 
described by Dow. 
Academic research in the area of moving averages dates 
from the work of Neftci and Policano [27], who studied 
moving averages, and the slope of price movements on 
the chart (named trendlines by technical analysts).  They 
studied closing prices of gold and T-bills, and created 
buy-and-sell rules based on trendlines and moving 
averages. Although they described their results from the 
study of trendlines as inconclusive, they reported a 
significant relationship between moving average signals 
and prices.  Of particular interest was the fact that a set 
of significant parameters for one commodity were often 
insignificant for another commodity.  This difference in 
significant parameters is often termed a markets 
‘personality’. 
Murphy [28] demonstrated that different sectors of the 
market move in relationships with other sectors, a field 
of study now known as Intermarket Analysis. 
Neftci [29] examined the relationship of the 150 day 
moving average rule to the Dow-Jones Index.  This 
research concluded that the moving average rule 
generated Markov times (no dependence on future 
information) and has predictive value. 
Two popular technical trading rules were tested by 
Brock et al. [30], namely, moving averages and trading 
range breaks (known by technical analysts as Support 
and Resistance trading).  Using data from the start of the 
DJIA in 1897 to the last trading day of 1986, the authors 
test a variety of combinations of moving averages, using 
a 1% band around predictions to eliminate whipsaws.  
They find support for the use of moving averages, and 
report that the differences in utility are not readily 
explained by risk.  They conclude their results are 
consistent with the technical rules having predictive 
power. 
Inspired by Brock et al [30] above, Mills [31] tests the 
same two trading rules in the London Stock Exchange, 
using FT30 data from 1935 – 1994.  Mills’ results are 
remarkably similar to Brocks, with Mills concluding that 
the trading rules could predict stock prices, and are thus 
profitable in periods when the market is inefficient. 
Levich and Thomas [32] test currency futures contracts 
in five currencies over the period 1976 to 1990.  They 
report persistent trading profits over the 15 year period 
using a variety of commonly researched moving average 
rules.  Levich and Thomas concluded ‘the profitability of 
trend following rules strongly suggest some form of 
serial dependency in the data, but the nature of the 
dependency remains unclear’. 
LeBaron [33] provided more support for the moving 
average, by using moving average rules as specification 
tests for foreign exchange rates.  He concluded that 
exchange rates do not follow the random walk, and that 
the deviations are detected by simple moving average 
rules. 
Lehmann [34]  considers evidence supporting variation 
in equity returns, attempting to decide whether the 
evidence is indicative of predictable changes in expected 
return, or market inefficiency.  Lehmann finds that 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ one week often experience 
reversals of fortune in the following week.  The costless 
portfolio constructed by Lehmann (difference between 
‘winner’ and ‘loser’ portfolios) showed profit in 90% of 
weeks.  Lehmann concludes that the reversals of fortune 
are probably reflections of the imbalances in the market 
for short-term liquidity, and states that ‘it is difficult to 
account for these results within the efficient markets 
framework’.  Lehmann’s work is often quoted by 
practitioners as supporting Technical Analysis, as it 
supports the idea that price trends occur frequently 
enough to create profit opportunities for technical 
traders.  Lehmann does not specifically make this 
statement. 
Jegadeesh [35] examines the predictability of monthly 
returns on individual securities.  Ten portfolios were 
formed based on the predicted returns using estimates of 
the regression parameters.  The difference between 
abnormal returns on the extreme decile portfolios was 
2.49 percent per month over the period 1934 to 1987.  
Slightly different values are provided when comparing 
extreme decile portfolios excluding January results 
(2.20% per month), and when January was considered 
separately (4.37% per month).  Jegadeesh rejects the 
random walk hypothesis, and concludes that returns 
predictability is due to either market inefficiency, or 
systematic changes in expected stock returns.   This 
paper is often used to support the principles of technical 
analysts, as it shows evidence that increases (and 
decreases) in prices during one month are often reversed 
out the following month.  Patterns of that nature would 
suggest that investors could profit from technical trading 
strategies, and would also be a breach of market 
efficiency. 
Very little academic research exists supporting the use of 
specific technical indicators and oscillators.  The main 
academic work above relates to Moving Average rules 
and Momentum based rules.  To allow the neural 
network to have access to the same types of indicators 
and oscillators being used by practitioners, a survey of 
the main practitioners journal, ‘The Technical Analysis 
of Stocks and Commodities’ was conducted.  For the 
sake of brevity, detailed reviews are not provided for the 
articles studied, rather, a list of the most ‘popular’ (i.e. 
most frequently referenced) technical variables is 
provided below.  The assumption is that these variables 
are most in use due to the fact that they are useful. 
Technical Variables most frequently cited in ‘The 
Technical Analysis of Stocks and Commodities’ 
Moving Averages (including a variety of derivatives 
built from basic moving averages) 
Volatility based variables, such as ATR (Average 
True Range) 
Volume based variables, such as Volume directly, or 
OBV (On Balance Volume) 
ADX (Average Directional Index – See Wilder [36]) 
Stochastics (based on the work of George Lane) 
Momentum (both price and volume) 
RSI (Relative Strength Index – See Wilder [36]) 
Variety of miscellaneous indicators and oscillators (eg 
MACD, Intermarket indicators, Money Flow, TRIN 
(Traders Index), etc) 
 
To sum up the position regarding technical analysis, it is 
reasonable to state that after a long absence from 
academia, technical analysis is beginning to enjoy a 
return to mainstream investment finance.  It is becoming 
more common to see universities promote subjects with 
titles such as ‘Computational Finance’, and even Siegel 
[37] ‘cautiously’ supports the use of Moving Averages.  
It should be noted that Computational Finance courses 
are not specifically devoted to Technical Analysis, but 
also cover other topics, such as Behavioural Finance and 
Intelligent Finance. 
Intelligent Finance seeks to develop a comprehensive 
undetstanding of financial markets by the combination of 
fundamental, technical and strategic analysis.  To pursue 
this field further, the reader is referred to Pan [38]. 
2.3. TRADING SYSTEMS 
According to Chande [39], a trading system consists of 
three major functions, namely: 
• Rules to enter and exit trades, 
• Risk Control, and, 
• Money Management 
 
2.3.1. RULES TO ENTER AND EXIT TRADES 
In the approach used in this paper, the ANN will be the 
signal generator, and its output will be used to either 
initiate or exit trades.  Rules to enter and exit trades are 
based on the strength of the ANN output signal.  This 
approach is discussed in detail in Section 3 Neural 
Network Creation. 
2.3.2. RISK CONTROL  
In the context of stock market trading, a trader is 
typically concerned with downside risk, which describes 
how much money is at risk on an individual trade-by-
trade basis.  This method of approaching risk leads to 
traders placing orders to sell/buy securities to cover open 
long/short positions when losses cross pre-determined 
thresholds.  These are known as stop-loss orders.  
 
As investors are typically preoccupied with return, it is 
also appropriate to consider risk to be appropriately 
controlled by trade risk within the confines of a trading 
system.  After all, this is the entire purpose of a trading 
system. This method of considering risk is growing in 
popularity, see for example Kaufman [40], Longo [41], 
and Pocini [42].   
 
A general framework for considering the issue of risk 
control is the TOPS COLA approach described by 
Chande [39].  TOPS COLA is an acronym for "take our 
profits slowly, cut off losses at once".  In effect, it 
describes the traders approach to risk.   
 
Trend following systems will typically have more losing 
trades than winning trades.  In financial terms, this still 
leads to a viable system, as long as the value of losing 
trades is quite low, and/or the value of winning trades is 
high.  Typically, according to Chande, about 5% of the 
trades made by a trend following system are the 'big 
ones'.  In light of this information, it is easy to see how 
the TOPS COLA approach can work. 
 
Risk control may therefore be defined as the process for 
managing open trades using predefined exit orders.  
Traders enter an initial stop-loss when they first enter a 
trade.    If the price of the security falls, then a stop-loss 
is triggered and a loss is taken.  Clearly, the closer the 
stop is to the actual price of the security, the less money 
will be lost if the price falls, but the more likely it is that 
a smaller price fluctuation or random noise will trigger 
the stop. If the stop price is further away from the 
current price, then there is potentially more money at 
risk, however, the chance is lower that the stop will be 
triggered by noise.  Chande provides evidence to suggest 
that the use of tight stops may well be degrading long 
term portfolio performance.  
 
If the price of a security rises, the trader may well adjust 
the stop loss to a break even stop, or a trailing stop.  A 
break-even stop will cancel out the trade if the price 
falls, at an amount equal to the trade cost.  A trailing 
stop will increase in value as the security price increase, 
either proportionately or otherwise.  The trailing stop 
will never move down, it is only ever moved up under 
the security price, so once the price of the security falls, 
the stop will be hit.  
 
A variety of methods are available, such as Volatility 
stops (refer to Overholser [43]), Fixed Dollar / Fixed 
Percent stops, Support and Resistance stops, Time delay 
stops, and Dev-Stops (refer to Kase [44, 45]). 
 
There are a number of variants of the stops described 
above, and stops may also be set relative to volatility, or 
period of time elapsed, or combinations of the above.  
Also, the use of profit targets is not uncommon.  These 
effectively exit a trade once a predefined amount of 
profit has been achieved.  There are variants of profit 
exits also, but, in general, they run contra to Chande’s 
principle of "take our profits slowly". 
 
When trading using longer term classical bar charting in 
the market, it is not uncommon for traders to use very 
simple stops, typically setting a basic money 
management stop on the initial purchase, and leaving 
that stop in for the duration of the trade.  The trade entry 
is determined by the detection of a trend, and the trade 
exit is controlled by the evidence that a trend has 
reversed, or ended.  This is entirely consistent with the 
definition provided by Pring [26], and the use of stops is 
reserved for exiting out of trades where a trend appeared 
to begin, but very quickly ended.  
 
It should be noted that there are a variety of other 
techniques in common usage, a brief summary of these 
is provided by Tharp [46].  Also, the use of stops within 
a given strategy, particularly if it is a long-term strategy, 
may not always be appropriate. Kaufman [40] 
demonstrates how the performance of a longer-term 
trending strategy without stops is most consistent, and 
concludes that the use of fixed value stops may even 
conflict with the strategy’s objectives. 
 
As can be seen, risk control for a trader concerns 
protecting open trades where money is at risk through 
the use of stops. In essence, although there are many 
styles of stop described above, the use of stops in this 
paper is simply to be able to site the neural networks 
developed within a realistic trading environment.  For 
this purpose, an initial stop-loss will suffice. 
 
The stop-loss threshold is selected by the study of the in-
sample MAE as described by Sweeney [47], and later by 
Tharp [46].  The MAE studies the Maximum Adverse 
Excursion (MAE) of a set of trades, in an effort to 
determine the extent to which favorable (profitable) 
trades range into unprofitable territory before closing out 
profitably.  This method of risk management allows 
traders to study the MAE characteristics of a set of 
trades, to identify preferred stop-loss points.   
 
As the choice of stop strategy is closely related to the 
method used to signal entries, a discussion on which stop 
thresholds to implement is delayed until Section 3 
Neural Network Creation. 
 
2.3.3. MONEY MANAGEMENT 
Money management, aka position sizing, refers to the 
actual size of the trade to be initiated, taking into 
consideration the account equity and potential trade risk. 
Like risk control, the style of money management is 
closely related to the trading system, as it is influenced 
by many variables which are constrained by the specific 
system.  As every trade carries a potential for loss, there 
is a need to determine the maximum amount of capital to 
expose at each trade, given a finite capital base.  A 
number of specific approaches exist, and the reader is 
encouraged to pursue the following references: 
• Kelly system: well described by Balsara [48] 
• Optimal f: refer to Vince [49] 
• Percent of equity: refer to Elder [50], and Pring 
[26] 
 
To simplify the complexities of Money Management, 
this paper suggests using a fixed percentage of equity per 
trade (as suggested by Elder) for testing and 
benchmarking.  Not only is this simple to implement, but 
it also avoids having to determine how much of any 
profit effect observed is attributable to the neural 
network developed, and how much is attributable strictly 
to money management.  Given the goal of this paper, 
this choice seems appropriate. 
 
3. NEURAL NETWORK CREATION 
This section of the paper describes the methodology to 
produce a neural network which behaves well in in-
sample testing.  When such a network is identified, the 
parameters which support this network are effectively 
frozen for out-of-sample testing.  It is at that point that 
the extent to which the ANN has been curve-fit will be 
revealed. 
3.1.1. SELECTING INPUTS 
Specific choices need to be made regarding the inputs to 
be selected.  At this point, it is important to have some 
expectation of the timeframe that the system will be used 
to trade.  Developing a long-term system may call for a 
greater reliance on fundamental variables, due to the 
timeframe of their production, and therefore, their likely 
influence.  Developing a short-term system may call for 
a greater reliance on technical variables. 
It is at this stage that the user must decide on their 
expected trading timeframe.  Typically, a distinction is 
made between investors and traders, with investors 
associated with longer-term holding periods, and traders 
associated with shorter-term holding periods.  The 
choice between trader and investor will influence the 
decision on which variables, fundamental or technical, 
will likely be the main neural network inputs.  
Choices can be made by studying the published research 
reviewed above, by experience, or by experimentation.  
Ideally, variables should be selected in line with 
published research, however, due to the lack of detailed 
research regarding technical variables, it is suggested 
that function profiles be used.  Function profiles 
effectively iterate a function through every possible 
realistic value, and measure the corresponding change in 
a different variable for every value of the function.  
Typically, they display their results graphically for easy 
interpretation. 
 
When selecting technical variables it is important not to 
let the ANNs have visibility of actual prices or volume, 
only ratios and indicators built from the prices and 
volume.  This will prevent the ANNs focusing on 
whether a stock has a high price (or volume) or a low 
price (or volume), and allow more for generalization 
about the ratios and indicators, and their relative 
relationships. As the goal with neural networks is to 
encourage generalization, supplying ratios to the neural 
network is an ideal way to accomplish this.  This is 
because the same ratio can be built from any number of 
numerators and denominators, and it is unlikely 
(although not inconceivable) that the exact values of the 
numerator and denominator are relevant.  Technical 
analysis generally focuses on ideas concerning price and 
volume behaviour, not the exact price and volume 
themselves.  
 
Note that when using fundamental variables as inputs, it 
is advisable to delay their input to the network by some 
fixed time period.  Typically, fundamental data is 
delayed by about 6 months before being used as an input 
to a neural network.  This ensures that the variables 
being acted on are available to the market at the time 
they are made available to the neural network.  Whilst 
some fundamental data is realized much more quickly 
than 6 months, the long lag is generally used to ensure 
that the neural network does not have access to data 
which would not have been available in the real-world.  
This is an essential element of backtesting. 
 
3.1.2. SELECTING OUTPUTS  
Again the selection of output variables is dependant on 
the expectation and timeframe of the system being 
developed.  From the research presented in the literature 
review, there are clearly a great many choices for output 
variables.   
 
While it may seem appropriate to attempt to predict 
price, a great deal of research shows that this is a 
particularly difficult task, possibly due to the fact that 
price changes do not tend to be smooth.  Predicting price 
direction appears easier, and more likely to be 
successful, but then the trader has no real way of 
gauging the strength of the move in that direction.  For 
example, a high degree of directional accuracy may not 
translate to high returns after costs if the movement in 
the direction forecast is small, as noted by Azoff [51] 
and Thawornwong and Enke [52].  Ruggiero [53] makes 
a number of suggestions, such as predicting a smoothed 
output function, such as a forward shifted technical 
indicator which is constructed from underlying price 
data.  However, there are a number of inherent 
advantages and disadvantages in all technical indicators, 
and whilst they may be smoother than price action, they 
are typically only suitable for trading whilst market 
action is favorable to that actual indicator.  For example, 
as Bauer [54],  Pring [26] and a host of other technical 
analysts explain, trend based indicators perform well 
whilst the market is trending, but perform poorly at other 
times.  Oscillators perform well when the market is not 
trending, but perform poorly otherwise.  The temptation 
to create two technical neural networks, one for each 
main type of market activity is easily avoided, as then a 
further methodology would be required to tell which 
network to use at which point in time.  In any event, a 
number of academics believe that the market actually 
goes through three phases, trending, non-trending, and 
chaotic, making the selection of which network to trust 
at which point in time much more complex.  For further 
information on training neural networks with chaotic 
constraints, see Slim and Trabelsi [55].  Finally, 
according to Ruggiero [56], the decision on which target 
to predict should be based on three factors, namely, the 
desired trade frequency, risk / reward criteria, and 
expertise available. 
 
In consideration of all of the above, it is proposed that 
the most useful ANN output is an indication of the 
relevant strength of any movement expected over the 
forecast period.  This should give rise to a highly 
tradeable indicator, which can be expected to perform 
during both trending and non-trending (and any other!) 
phases of the market.  
 
The method suggested here is to build an output variable 
which effectively captures the strength of expected 
return movement.  Such a variable is easily built by 
measuring the maximum price change over some 
timeframe after the variable is sampled.  This leads to a 
neural network which can give a strength forecast based 
on the inputs provided.  This is particularly useful when 
choosing between a number of possible positions, and in 
setting thresholds for entry and exit rules. 
 
A simple 200 day strength variable may be computed as: 
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For long-term trading systems, 1 year is a typical look-
ahead period, see for example, Longo [41] and 
Reinganum [57].  
Specific timeframe lengths could be determined by 
searching for cycles, but as already stated earlier, it is 
generally accepted that the market dynamics are 
changing over time. Thus, there appears little benefit in 
determining the optimal timeframe at any point in time, 
as it could not be relied on to hold, thus reducing the 
expected lifetime of a trading strategy, and adding 
additional risk (see for example, Balsara et al [58]). 
Published work exists which describes cycles already 
found in the Australian stockmarket, such as a 6-day 
cycle discovered by Pan et al. [59], however, this was 
discovered in the AORD index, and there is no reason to 
expect it would hold for individual stocks, each with its 
own individual characteristics.  For example, it could be 
expected that certain stocks had radically different cycle 
lengths, such as bank stocks following the economic 
cycle, resource stocks following the strength of the 
industrial cycle in other countries, etc.  Other published 
works use PCA (Principal Component Analysis) (e.g. 
Raposo et al. [60]), or Self Organizing Maps (e.g. Chi et 
al. [61]). 
Essentially, the practical solution, and indeed, the 
objective, is to select timeframes which are consistent 
with the traders trading expectations.  This idea is 
consistently presented in literature describing the 
techniques involved in building trading systems, for 
example, Ruggiero [56]. 
 
Finally, Azoff [51] suggests the network have only one 
output, to avoid the effect of conflicting outputs pulling 
the weights in opposing directions during training.  In 
this way the network is effectively focused on one task 
only.   
 
 
3.1.3. PARTITIONING AVAILABLE DATA 
Any study involving optimization, or neural networks 
must logically (or better still, physically) separate data 
which will be used for training, from data that will be 
used for testing.   
 
There is acceptance within the academic community that 
the relationship between security prices (and returns), 
and the variables that constitute that price (return), 
changes over time as described by Refenes et al. [62] 
and also by Thawornwong and Enke [52].  In other 
words, the structural mechanics of the market are 
changing over time, and their effects on prices are also 
changing.  For this reason, it is necessary to partition 
data vertically rather than horizontally.  A vertical 
partition of a dataset will divide each securities dataset 
into two partitions, one for training, and one for testing.  
Typically, the training dataset is larger, and covers a 
significant date range of the overall data, whilst the 
testing dataset is smaller, and used to provide out-of-
sample confidence.  These two partitions are typically 
known as in-sample (training), and out-of-sample 
(testing) partitions.  Using this approach, every securities 
data will be partitioned into training and testing subsets. 
 
The horizontal approach to partitioning splits the entire 
range of data into either a training or a testing block.  For 
example, horizontally partitioning 10 datasets, with 60% 
in training, and 40% as testing would yield 6 entire 
datasets used for training, and 4 entire datasets used for 
testing.  This approach is invalid when it is recognized 
that the structural mechanics change over time, due to 
the fact that a neural network may well learn correlations 
that could not have been known in chronological time, 
and later, exploit these during the testing phase.  This 
may well lead to higher quality predictions, but is clearly 
unrealistic. 
 
In summary, it is advised to split all available security 
data vertically, with the final date of all training subsets 
aligned.  The actual ratio for the split is generally chosen 
dependant on how much data is available, and is often 
arbitrarily chosen.  However, some general guidelines 
can be distilled.  For example, Ruggiero [56] suggests 
that the data sets used for training should cover a period 
at least 5 times longer than the desired life of the model 
to be produced, and suggests using 80% of the data for 
training, and 20% for testing.  Azoff [51] takes a typical 
approach, which suggests that the training period should 
be long enough to cover typical market behaviour, 
including bull, bear, and sideways moving markets.  
Kaufman [40] suggests a 70:30 split between training 
and testing, Kim and Lee [63] suggest an 80:20 split, 
Gately [64] suggests saving only 10% of the available 
data for testing, thus a 90:10 split. From an optimization 
point of view, Pardo [65] suggests choosing a period 
long enough to cover a variety of market activity, and 
advises choosing a size large enough to generate at least 
30 trades for statistical validity.   Pardo also notes that 
the size of the models test window will affect trading 
shelf life, specifying that the life of the model will be 
between one-eight and one-quarter of the test window.  
Pardo further suggests a rule-of-thumb that the walk-
forward window (in optimization) should be 
approximately 10% - 20% of the optimization window. 
 
There are a wide variety of other competing and 
complementary guidelines available.  In essence, the 
main principle is to capture as much diverse market 
activity as possible (with a long training window), whilst 
keeping as long a testing window as possible (to increase 
shelf life and model confidence).  This study 
recommends sourcing at least 10 years data for each 
security, and then performing an 80:20 split. In this way, 
80% of the data will be used for training, and 20% will 
be reserved for testing. This split provides a reasonable 
compromise, and takes the above guidelines into 
consideration. 
 
Neural networks must be trained on data which includes 
delisted securities, to enable the neural network access to 
data which describes the real world environment.  Not 
including data for securities which have delisted 
introduces survivorship bias. From a trading point of 
view, the trader cannot benefit from survivorship bias, so 
including the data for delisted securities will represent 
the worst case results, and these will be directly 
applicable to the trader. 
 
3.1.4. IN-SAMPLE BENCHMARKS 
As neural networks are developed in this methodology to 
be signal generators, and in-sample testing is initially 
outside of the context of a trading system, the test metric 
comparing different neural network architectures must 
be on the basis of their in-sample training.  These in-
sample metrics are used to assess the quality of the 
neural network architectures tests (see section 3.1.5 
Determining Architecture). It is not appropriate to test 
each neural network architecture on the out of sample 
results and select the best performer.   
 
For this reason, it is necessary to define metrics which 
can be used to test different neural network architectures, 
and the metrics presented below are focused on 
identifying how well the neural network has learnt its 
objective.  Different metrics are provided for cases when 
the neural network is focused on long-term timeframes, 
or short term timeframes. 
 
In the case of a long-term timeframe, a useful in-sample 
metric is the networks selectivity.  This is because long-
term trading networks usually serve as stock screening 
strategies.  That is, they are designed to filter the entire 
market of stocks, and identify those which have the 
greatest chance of the highest appreciation within the 
expected trading time period. The signal generated by 
these neural networks is effectively a prediction of the 
likely strength of price increase over the next 1 year 
period. 
 
To determine how to evaluate a screening strategy, it is 
necessary to review the purpose of such a strategy.    
Specifically, a screening strategy is used to reduce 
(refine) the number of securities that are competing for 
capital. A traders’ requirement is to increase the 
likelihood of selecting stocks that will significantly 
increase in value. Thus, a suitable measure of success is 
to determine the percentage of stocks selected that 
achieve a pre-specified increase in value. By measuring 
these values for the entire market, then for the ANN 
predictions, it can easily be determined whether the 
neural network is effective.    Finally, care must be taken 
to ensure that a reasonable number of predictions are 
output by the ANN for this process.  Clearly, it would 
not make sense to select a network with a 100% success 
rating if there was only 1 trade predicted. 
 
The metric used for this style of longer-term screening 
strategy measurement, termed Filter Selectivity, is 
defined as: 
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where  
 
ClosedTrades is the number of trades closed due to 
meeting the predefined increase in value 
TotalTrades is the total number of trades selected by the 
screening strategy 
 
 
For shorter term timeframes, such as those relying solely 
on technical variables, an objective measure of a 
accuracy is the measure of expectancy.  The idea of 
expectancy in trading was first raised by Tharp [46], 
who proposed it as a useful method to compare trading 
systems.  Expectancy is a measure of the expected profit 
per dollar risked on a fixed position size basis.  It is used 
without money management settings enabled, which is 
appropriate for the in-sample testing.  There are a 
number of variant formulas for calculating expectancy, 
this version presented is more conservative than Tharp’s; 
it uses the average loss as the standard of risk (rather 
than the minimum loss as used by Tharp). 
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where 
AW = Average amount won on profitable trade 
PW = Probability of winning 
AL = Average amount lost on losing trade (-ve) 
PL = Probability of losing 
 
Secondly, to assess the quality of the ANN architecture 
chosen, it is also appropriate to consider the ‘Average 
Profit/Loss %’, which is a standard trading system 
metric. 
 
3.1.5. DETERMINING ARCHITECTURE 
There are no standard rules available for determining the 
appropriate number of hidden layers and hidden neurons 
per layer, although for greater generalization, the smaller 
the number of hidden nodes and hidden layers the better.  
General rules of thumb have been proposed by a number 
of researchers.  For example, Shih [66] suggests 
constructing nets to have a pyramidical topology, which 
can be used to infer approximate numbers of hidden 
layers and hidden neurons.  Azoff [51] quotes a theorem 
due to Komolgorov that suggests a network with one 
hidden layer and 2N + 1 hidden neurons is sufficient for 
N inputs.  Azoff concludes that the optimum number of 
hidden neurons and hidden layers is highly problem 
dependant, and is a matter for experimentation.  Gately 
[64] suggests setting the number of hidden nodes to be 
equal to the total of the number of inputs and outputs.  
As another alternative, some researchers, for example 
Kim at al. [67] use a brute force approach, and train a 
great number of ANNs with different configurations, and 
then select that configuration that performed best.  Yet 
another approach, such as that used by Jaruszewicz and 
Mandziuk [68] is to train networks for a fixed number of 
epochs, or fixing the number of hidden nodes to some 
arbitrary value, as in Kim and Lee [63]. Zirilli [69] 
proposes a formula based on prior knowledge of the 
number of unique patterns the net is expected to learn, 
but concedes that if you know your feature space well 
enough, you can usually determine this number of 
hidden nodes better yourself. Finally, another reasonably 
popular method is used by some researchers such as Kim 
& Lee [63] and Versace et al [70], whereby genetic 
algorithms are used to select between the combinatorial 
explosion of possible networks given choices such as 
network type, architecture, activation functions, input 
selection and preprocessing. 
 
An alternative approach described by Tan [1], is to start 
with a small number of hidden neurons and increase the 
number of hidden neurons gradually.  Tan’s procedure 
begins with 1 hidden layer, containing the square root of 
N hidden nodes, where N is the number of inputs.  
Training the network takes place until a pre-determined 
number of epochs have taken place without achieving a 
new low in the error function.  For example, ANNs can 
be trained until no new low had been achieved for at 
least 2000 epochs. At this point the network would be 
tested against the in-sample set, and benchmarked using 
the appropriate metrics described above. A new neural 
network is now created with the number of hidden nodes 
increased by 1, and the training and in-sample testing is 
repeated.  After each test, the metric being used for 
benchmarking is assessed, to see if the new network 
configuration is superior.  This process continues while 
the networks being produced are superior, that is, it 
terminates at the first network produced which shows 
inferior in-sample results.  
 
This approach to training is an implementation of the 
early stopping method, which aims to preserve the 
generalization capabilities of neural networks.  It is 
based on the observation that validation error normally 
decreases at the beginning of the training process, and 
begins to increase when the network starts to over-fit. 
Lack of generalization is caused by over-fitting.  In an 
over-fit (over-trained, over-learned) situation, the 
network begins to memorize training examples, and 
loses the ability to generalize to new situations. 
 
3.1.6. SETTING SIGNAL THRESHOLDS 
Each neural network developed has fit itself to the 
characteristics of the market which the training data 
represents, within the constraints of its architecture. A 
simple way to observe this fit is with the use of a 
function profile.  From inspection of the function 
profiles for each neural network, the threshold at which 
the neural network output signal begins to signal 
profitable trades can be easily established.   
 
Therefore, for the in-sample testing, the buy signal 
should take account of the individual neural networks 
threshold, and also take account of whether the signal is 
increasing in strength, or decreasing in strength from its 
previous forecast.  Naturally, the sell signal should also 
take account of the threshold, and also take account of 
whether the signal is increasing in strength, or 
decreasing in strength from its previous forecast.  It is 
also considered a desirable property of a trading system 
if the rules for exiting a trade are the contra to the rules 
for entering it. 
 
Therefore, a general buy and a general sell rule can be 
explicitly stated, and then applied to each trading 
system.  Where x is the signal strength threshold chosen 
from the function profile, then the entry and exit rules 
become: 
 
Buy: Buy tomorrow when neural signal output(today) > 
x, and neural signal output(today) > neural signal 
output(yesterday) 
 
Sell: Sell tomorrow when neural signal output(today) <= 
x, and neural signal output(today) < neural signal 
output(yesterday) 
 
These simple buy and sell rules take account of the 
threshold signal strengths, and using the same generic 
buy and sell rule for each network gives greater 
confidence of the generalization of the results. 
 
This paper suggested that for each neural network, the 
output is a signal strength rating, scaled between 0 and 
100.  It is then to be expected that, in general, as the 
numeric value of the signal increases, so should the 
expected returns to this signal strength.  This general 
principle should be seen by examining a function profile 
of the signal output of each neural network.  
 
3.1.7. SETTING TRADING STOPS 
 
In this methodology, the MAE technique previously 
discussed is suggested.  This technique can be used to 
identify an appropriate stop-loss percentage for the in-
sample set of trades.  This stop-loss percentage is then 
used to control trading risk for the out-of-sample trades.   
 
By building a histogram of the actual (in-sample) trade 
data, split according to trades that were eventually won 
(were profitable), and trades that were eventually lost 
(were unprofitable), a visual inspection can be made of a 
useful stop threshold.  This information is very valuable 
to a trader, as it also gives an indication of how the 
profit/loss percentages will be affected when the stop is 
introduced.  In this approach, the stop percentage value 
determined from the in-sample data will be then used as 
the stop value in the out-of-sample testing data. 
 
Typically, the exact value chosen is selected by 
“eyeballing”; what is required is to locate the point at 
which the number of ‘winning’ trades falls away very 
sharply, whilst typically the number of ‘losing’ trades 
does not.  According to Chande’s principles, if in doubt, 
we should err towards selecting a larger value of stop 
loss than a smaller one.  This gives a trade plenty of 
room to develop a profitable outcome.  The main reason 
we should err towards wide stops, is that if a stoploss is 
hit, it will always force us to incur a loss.  There is never 
a profitable outcome for a stoploss being triggered.   
This implies that if the decision to take the trade is 
correct, then we should attempt to stay in the trade for as 
long as possible, and avoid being shaken out by noise, or 
short-term adverse behaviour. 
 
The graph below represents the MAE/MFE observations 
for a trading system which doesn’t use stops. These 
MAE/MFE observations are taken from the in-sample 
test of the trading system. By “eyeballing” the graph, it 
is clear that the majority of successful trades don’t stray 
further than 5% into the red before rebounding to 
conclude profitably.  In this case, the threshold would be 
set at 5%. 
 
 
 
4. REAL-WORLD CONSTRAINTS 
There are a great variety of tradable securities and 
trading mechanisms available.  The trading systems 
considered in this paper are all 'long' end-of-day 
systems.  That is, the systems implemented only trade 
long positions, and do not attempt to sell stocks short.   
 
One of the main issues with short-selling is that it cannot 
just be assumed that stocks can be sold short.  The 
reason for this is that in some markets only certain 
securities can be sold short, and these can only be sold 
short at certain times.  For example, the method the ASX 
(Australian Stock Exchange) uses to determine which 
shares can be sold short can make short-side selling 
reasonably complex.  In effect, the ASX determine the 
list of Approved Securities (for short selling), and allow 
not more than 1/10th of the total quantity in issue of 
eligible securities to be short sold.  The shortsell list is 
updated every trading day, based on the shortsell list for 
the previous trading day, as described by the Australian 
Stock Exchange, in the Short Sales document [71].  For 
an individual trader, it is very difficult to know 
historically whether a short-sell transaction could 
actually have been executed. 
 
All trades initiated from end-of-day data must be day+1 
long market orders.  This means that after a signal is 
given, then the trade takes place on the next day the 
market is open, at market open price.  For example, after 
the market has closed on day t, the trading system would 
be run, and any buy (sell) signals generated are queued 
for opening positions (closing positions) for the start of 
the next days trading, day t+1.  In this way, there is no 
possibility of acting on information which is not publicly 
available to all traders.  In essence, this is similar to the 
issue of displacing fundamental data by at least 6 
months, again, to ensure that the trading system is not 
being tested on data which was not available in the 
market. 
 
All trading simulations must account for transaction 
costs, and it is advised that these be over-estimated for 
historical testing.  Traditionally, the cost of brokerage 
for individuals has been falling, therefore, using todays 
transaction costs to simulate historical trading results as 
of 10 years ago is very misleading, particularly if the 
strategy being tested generates a large number of trades. 
 
Another realistic simulation constraint is slippage.  
Although a trade may be initiated at market open, this 
does not mean the trade will be opened (closed) at 
market open price.  There will inevitably be slippage due 
to the fact that at market open there may be a great many 
trades scheduled.  Naturally, the price can move around 
quite considerably in the early part of trading, and 
slippage is the method to account for this cost.  Slippage 
settings of 5% would be reasonable. 
It is also important when developing and benchmarking 
systems of this type that simulations respect volume 
constraints.  It is not realistic to assume that there is an 
unlimited amount of stock available for purchase.  
Historical technical data includes the volume data item.  
When training and testing, it is realistic to assume that 
the positions sizes acquired be some smallish factor of 
the overall trade volume available. A suitable factor 
might be 5%, or perhaps even less dependant on the 
market volatility.   
Finally, it is unwise in historical simulations to refer 
directly to cut-off values for variables such as price.  For 
example, it would be unrealistic to include a condition 
that price must be less than $5 to initiate a trade.  
Historic price data is adjusted for splits etc, therefore, 
historically a price may be shown as $5, but at the actual 
date that stock was traded in the market, it could well 
have been a different price. 
5. BENCHMARKING 
Once the appropriate in-sample architecture has been 
decided, the architecture and training must be frozen, 
and the network can proceed to out-of-sample 
benchmarking. At the same time, all the parameters of 
signal strength threshold, stop-loss threshold and money 
management threshold used in the in-sample testing 
must also be frozen. 
 
A primary objective of a trading system is to produce 
(and capture) profit.  However, in itself, the amount of 
profit obtained is an unsuitable benchmark for a variety 
of reasons.  The desire to produce a profit must be 
tempered with such considerations as trading risk, equity 
curve management, amount of capital required, 
drawdown, and consistency.  These factors determine 
how tradeable a system would be in practice. 
 
Trading systems are typically assessed according to a 
variety of metrics.  The metrics presented in Table 1 are 
sourced from Babcock Jr [72], Chande [39], Ruggiero 
[56], Pardo [65], Kaufman [40], Tharp [46], and Refenes 
[73].  Each metric is briefly discussed, and where 
appropriate, guidelines for desirable values are given. 
 
It should be remembered that the factors which 
determine whether a system is acceptable or not are 
ultimately the choice of the trader.  No system should be 
chosen if it displays undesirable characteristics; 
however, individual traders would differ on their choice 
of system, dependant on such issues as their tolerance to 
risk, their amount of starting capital, and their trading 
horizon. 
 
 
Metric Brief Description 
Net Profit Ending Capital – Starting 
Capital 
Annualized Gain (%) Annualized Net Profit (Loss). 
aka Annual Percentage Return 
(APR) 
Number of Trades Total Trades initiated by 
strategy 
Exposure (%) Area of portfolio equity exposed 
to market, as calculated on a 
day-by-day basis. 
Winning Trades (%) Percentage of trades that were 
winners. 
Average Profit (%) Average profit per winning 
trade, expressed as a percentage.  
Includes effect of trading costs, 
and does not take open positions 
into account. 
Losing Trades (%) Percentage of trades that were 
losers. 
Average Loss (%) Average loss per losing trade, 
expressed as a percentage.  
Includes effect of trading costs, 
and does not take open positions 
into account. 
Max. Drawdown (%) Largest peak to valley decline in 
the equity curve, on a closing 
price basis, expressed as a 
percentage of open equity. 
Profit Factor Gross Profit divided by Gross 
Loss. (Desirable systems should 
display over 2 for this ratio). 
Recovery Factor Absolute value of Net Profit 
divided by Max Drawdown. 
(Desirable system must display 
over 1 for this ratio). 
Payoff Ratio Absolute value of average profit 
per trade divided by average 
loss per trade. (Desirable system 
must display over 2 for this 
ratio). 
Sharpe ratio Sharpe Ratio measures risk 
adjusted return.  Specifically, 
the ratio indicates the historic 
average differential return per 
unit of historic variability of the 
differential return.  Sharpe [74] 
provides a detailed discussion of 
the limitations and uses of the 
Sharpe Ratio.  It is calculated by 
obtaining the average 
percentage return of the trades 
generated, as well as the 
standard deviation of returns.  
The average return and average 
standard deviation are 
annualized by using the average 
number of days held per trade as 
a baseline.  The annualized 
average return is then divided by 
the annualized standard 
deviation of returns. 
Ulcer Index Ulcer Index measures overall 
volatility of a portfolio.   It is the 
square root of the sum of the 
squared drawdowns. 
Luck Coefficient Shows how the largest (by 
profit) trade compares to the 
average trade. 
Pessimistic Rate of 
Return 
A statistical adjustment of the 
wins to losses ratio for the 
purpose of estimating the worst 
expected return based on 
previous results.  Pessimistic 
Rate of Return is calculated by 
decreasing the number of 
winning trades by the square 
root of the total winners, and 
increasing the number of losing 
trades by the square root of the 
number of losers.  The result is 
then computed by multiplying 
the new number of winners by 
the average amount won, and 
dividing this by the new number 
of losers multiplied by the 
average amount lost. 
Equity Drop Ratio Potential for loss expressed as a 
probability by computing the 
standard deviation of all drops 
in the equity curve measured 
from each equity low to the 
previous equity high and 
dividing the result into the 
annualized return.  Only equity 
drops greater than 2% are 
considered.  The equity drop 
ratio favors higher profits, 
favors short term fluctuations in 
the equity curve, and does not 
penalize a system for large gains 
(as only equity drops are used to 
measure risk).  
Table 1 Trading System Metrics 
 
Further, when benchmarking a trading system, it is 
appropriate to perform a students t-test to determine the 
likelihood that the observed profitability is due to 
chance.  This is the method recommended by Katz [75], 
Katz and McCormick [76], Chande [39], Stakelum [77], 
and Kaufman [40].   
 
The means of the strategies developed are tested against 
the mean of the distribution curve that a random trading 
strategy would produce, which is assumed to be zero 
under the null hypothesis of no excess returns. 
 
The hypotheses for the t-tests would be: 
H0: µprofit = 0,  
H1: µprofit > 0 
 
The use of the t-test relies on assumptions of normality 
and independence.  Essentially, these assumptions are 
constraints upon the usefulness of the t-test in evaluating 
trading systems.   
 
Typically, the assumption of normality is dealt with by 
reference to the Central Limit Theorem, which indicates 
that as the number of cases in the sample increases, the 
distribution of the sample mean approaches normal.  
Consequently, as long as the sample size is adequate 
(generally stated as at least 30 samples), the statistic can 
be applied with reasonable assurance.  
 
The constraint of independence presents a more difficult 
issue when testing trading systems.  Essentially, the 
violation is potentially one of serial dependence, which 
occurs when cases constituting a sample are not 
statistically independent of one another.  One method of 
dealing with this issue is to perform a runs test, as 
described by Vince [49].  The runs test shows whether 
the sequence of wins and losses in the sample trades 
contains more or less streaks than would ordinarily be 
expected in a truly random sequence, which has no 
dependence between trials.  Although a runs test does 
not prove or disprove dependency, it can be used to 
determine an acceptable confidence limit in order to 
accept or reject a hypothesis of dependency. Vince 
demonstrates the runs test is essentially a matter of 
obtaining the Z scores for the win and loss streaks of 
systems trades, as follows: 
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where 
N = total number of trades, 
Equation 1 Computing the Z-Score for a Runs test 
 
It should be noted that serial dependency is not 
necessarily an issue for system tradeability, and for more 
advanced forms of money management, it may well be 
desirable. 
Once out-of-sample benchmarking has been completed, 
the trader has a realistic model of the trading system, 
which can then be realistically assessed.  From this 
model, the trader can make accurate judgements about 
whether this particular trading system meets the trader’s 
specific individual trading requirements. 
Consistency is one of the most important areas for a 
trader to focus on, and the level of system consistency 
can be determined by comparing the figures for the in-
sample model to the figures for the out-of-sample model.  
Clearly, the smaller the amount of variation between the 
two models, the greater the likelihood that the neural 
network has captured the generalities of the profit-
generating phenomena. 
An accurate model also serves another purpose; it gives 
the trader guidelines within which to operate.  Should 
the trader decide to trade using this model, then it will be 
clear going forward whether the model is operating 
within the expected guidelines, and, more importantly, it 
will give early warning if the model unexpectedly 
deviates from expectations.  This could happen if some 
underlying characteristic of the market changed, and it is 
important for the trader to realize this as soon as 
possible. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a methodology for designing 
and testing stockmarket trading systems using soft 
computing technologies, specifically artificial neural 
networks.   
A number of models have been developed using the 
methodology presented in this paper.  For examples of 
this methodology in practice, the reader may wish to 
pursue other papers written by the authors in this area, 
for example Vanstone et al. [78, 79].  These papers step 
through the process of selecting input variables, 
designing artificial neural networks for trading, and 
benchmarking of the trading results. 
This methodology presented clearly separates the in-
sample process of training neural networks and selecting 
parameters from the out-of-sample benchmarking 
process.  It also aims to ensure that if the neural models 
developed during the in-sample training process are 
curve-fit, then that is clearly exposed during the out-of-
sample benchmarking.  This process of breaking up the 
development into a number of discrete, testable steps 
provides another advantage – it allows the developer to 
focus on correcting a specific part of the process if and 
when things go wrong. 
The objective of developing viable mechanical 
stockmarket trading systems based on technologies such 
as neural networks is achievable.  The key is to conduct 
the development process within a well-defined 
methodology, and as close to real-world constraints as 
possible.   
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